Psychiatry is rapidly adopting digital phenotyping and artificial intelligence/machine learning tools to study mental illness based on tracking participants’ locations, online activity, phone and text message usage, heart rate, sleep, physical activity, and more. Existing ethical frameworks for return of individual research results (IRRs) are inadequate to guide researchers for when, if, and how to return this unprecedented number of potentially sensitive results about each participant’s real-world behavior. To address this gap, we convened an interdisciplinary expert working group, supported by (...) a National Institute of Mental Health grant. Building on established guidelines and the emerging norm of returning results in participant-centered research, we present a novel framework specific to the ethical, legal, and social implications of returning IRRs in digital phenotyping research. Our framework offers researchers, clinicians, and Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) urgently needed guidance, and the principles developed here in the context of psychiatry will be readily adaptable to other therapeutic areas. (shrink)

Societies with a higher level of income inequality tend to have lower levels of intergenerational income mobility. Known as the Great Gatsby Curve, this negative relationship in part derives from greater intergenerational economic heritance among the poor. Societies with higher rates of relative poverty will have a higher level of income inequality, but they will also tend to have lower intergenerational mobility due to the reduced capacity of low-income persons to become upwardly mobile. Reviewing relevant research in psychology, we describe (...) how poverty is associated with decreased psychological resources that compromise the competitiveness of low-income persons for superior attainment in the educational system and for greater productivity in the labor market. Economic deprivation in itself thus leads to a “vicious circle” of disadvantage that diminishes intergenerational mobility even without the existence of any culture of poverty or monopolistic institutions in the economy. (shrink)

This book assesses how Vatican II opened up the Catholic Church to encounter, dialogue, and engagement with other world religions. Opening with a contribution from the President of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, Cardinal Jean-Louis Tauran, it next explores the impact, relevance, and promise of the Declaration Nostra Aetate before turning to consider how Vatican II in general has influenced interfaith dialogue and the intellectual and comparative study of world religions in the postconciliar decades, as well as the contribution (...) of particular past and present thinkers to the formation of current interreligious and comparative theological methods. Additionally, chapters consider interreligious dialogue vis-à-vis theological anthropology in conciliar documents; openness to the spiritual practices of other faith traditions as a way of encouraging positive interreligious encounter; the role of lay and new ecclesial movements in interreligious dialogue; and the development of Monastic Interreligious Dialogue. Finally, it includes a range of perspectives on the fruits and future of Vatican’s II’s opening to particular faiths such as Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. (shrink)

We study and compare two combinatorial lowness notions: strong jump-traceability and well-approximability of the jump, by strengthening the notion of jump-traceability and super-lowness for sets of natural numbers. A computable non-decreasing unbounded function h is called an order function. Informally, a set A is strongly jump-traceable if for each order function h, for each input e one may effectively enumerate a set Te of possible values for the jump JA, and the number of values enumerated is at most h. A′ (...) is well-approximable if can be effectively approximated with less than h changes at input x, for each order function h. We prove that there is a strongly jump-traceable set which is not computable, and that if A′ is well-approximable then A is strongly jump-traceable. For r.e. sets, the converse holds as well. We characterize jump-traceability and strong jump-traceability in terms of Kolmogorov complexity. We also investigate other properties of these lowness properties. (shrink)

This note presents a simple, novel diagnostic for determining the phrase structural status of negative markers cross-linguistically, a topic of enduring interest (for recent approaches and references see Haegeman; Zanuttini; Giannakidou, Landscape and Polarity). If the sentential negative marker in a given language is phrasal (an XP, generally adverbial), it will occur in the collocation why not?; if it is a head (an X 0, generally clitic-like), it will not. In the latter languages, the word for ‘no’ can sometimes be (...) used, itself (presumably) a phrasal negative adverb. (A fortiori, languages with possibly word-internal morphological markers for sentential negation, such as Turkish, will not allow these markers in the collocation.) The first group of languages, those with XP negative markers, is given in 1: (1) a. English why not? * why no?1 b. German warum nicht? * warum nein? c. Dutch waarom niet? * waarom nee? d. Danish hvorfor ikke? * hvorfor nej? e. Icelandic hverfor ekki? * hvarfor nej? f. French pourquoi pas? * pourquoi non?2 g. Tsez shida anu? * shida ey? The second class of languages, those with X0 negative markers, is given in 2. (shrink)

Using Virginia Woolf's Mrs. Dalloway as primary text to illuminate the human experience of time, it is argued against T. Armstrong (in Modernism) that the depiction of time by Modernist writers such as Woolf is Heideggerian rather than Bergsonian. This study is used to reveal the originality of Heidegger as opposed to Bergson, whose ideas on time, it is suggested, are merely an accumulation of traces of previous ideas on time. Drawing on Aristotle's Metaphysica, De Interpretatione, Ethico Nicomachea, Rhetorica and (...) Physica to develop a new vocabulary, Heidegger revealed the distinctive ontological foundation of space and time in connecting temporality with being. The characters in Mrs. Dalloway illustrate the difference between an authentic and an inauthentic relation to the temporality of being. Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;}. (shrink)

ÂÜóåé äåäïì_íùí äéáöüñùí ãëùóó_í, ôï _áñüí Üñèñï _ñïôåßíåé ìéá êáéíï_ñãéá ãåíßêåõóç ó÷åôéêÜ ìå ôçí äéáíïì_ ôùí wh-ôåëåóô_í ïé ï_ïßïé äåóìå_ïõí å_áíáëç_ôéê_ò áíôùíõìßåò åíôüò íçóßäùí: ô_ôïéïé ôåëåóô_ò äåí _÷ïõí êëßóç _ô_óçò. Áõô_ ç ãåíßêåõóç _ñïê__ôåé á_ü ôçí õ_üèåóç üôé ï wh-ôåëåóô_ò _áñÜãåôáé óôïí _ñïóäéïñéóô_ CP, ìáêñéÜ á_ü ï_ïéáä__ïôå êåöáë_ _ïõ äßíåé _ô_óç. Áí åßíáé óùóô_, ç áíÜëõóç áõô_ êáèéóôÜ Üêõñåò ôéò _ñïçãï_ìåíåò áíáë_óåéò _ïõ õ_ïè_ôïõí üôé ïé å_áíáëç_ôéê_ò áíôùíõìßåò á_ïôåëï_í «spellouts» ìéáò wh-ìåôáêßíçóçò ç ï_ïßá _áñáâéÜæåé íçóßäá.

In talking about the compatibility of quantum observables, discussions often center on the question of whether the corresponding operators commute—even though commutativity is a coarse-grained notion that largely fails to capture the salient “nonclassical” features of quantum theory. Often, too, such discussions involve the issue of whether the operators in question satisfy a Heisenberg-like inequality, of the form ΔA·ΔB≥r>0—even though such inequalities are specific to unbounded operators and (for this and other reasons) are typically not a useful way to discuss (...) joint uncertainty in quantum mechanics. In the present paper we emphasize a simpler dichotomy, in which operator pairs (A, B) are classified according to whether or not states can be found with arbitrarily small dispersions in both A and B. If A and B cannot be made arbitrarily dispersionless simultaneously, then we call A and B an uncertainty pair. Otherwise, we call A and B a certainty pair. An interesting feature of uncertainty pairs in particular is that they are stable, in the sense that if A and B form an uncertainty pair, then slight enough perturbations of A and B must also form an uncertainty pair. This stability, obvious in the finite-dimensional case, follows in general from an operator inequality derived herein. A consequence of this inequality is that perturbed position and momentum operators X+δX and P+δP cannot share an eigenvector unless |δX|·|δP|≥ℏ/2. (Here vertical bars denote the operator norm.) This, despite the fact that (as we show) arbitrarily slight perturbations of X and P can fail to satisfy a Heisenberg inequality—a fact which raises interesting measurement issues in its own right. (shrink)

Readings of the Vessantara Jātaka. Edited with an introduction by Steven Collins. Columbia Readings of Buddhist Literature. New York: Columbia University Press, 2016. Pp. x + 216. $90 ; $30 ; $29.99.

Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense By BaumannPeterOxford University Press, 2017. x + 266 pp.

There have two recent challenges to the orthodoxy that ‘X trusts Y to ø’ is the fundamental notion of trust. Domenicucci and Holton maintain that trust, like love and friendship, is fundamentally two-place. Paul Faulkner argues to the more radical conclusion that the one-place ‘X is trusting’ is explanatorily basic. I argue that ‘X trusts Y in domain D’ is the explanatorily basic notion. I make the case that only by thinking of trust as domain-specific can we make sense of (...) the relationships between trust and belief in goodwill, trust and distrust, and trust and trustworthiness. In addition, by modeling trust as essentially domain-specific we can account for the way in which wise trust in others is finely discriminating. (shrink)

We investigate the strength of a randomness notion ${\cal R}$ as a set-existence principle in second-order arithmetic: for each Z there is an X that is ${\cal R}$-random relative to Z. We show that the equivalence between 2-randomness and being infinitely often C-incompressible is provable in $RC{A_0}$. We verify that $RC{A_0}$ proves the basic implications among randomness notions: 2-random $\Rightarrow$ weakly 2-random $\Rightarrow$ Martin-Löf random $\Rightarrow$ computably random $\Rightarrow$ Schnorr random. Also, over $RC{A_0}$ the existence of computable randoms is equivalent (...) to the existence of Schnorr randoms. We show that the existence of balanced randoms is equivalent to the existence of Martin-Löf randoms, and we describe a sense in which this result is nearly optimal. (shrink)

In this essay, I take up the question of why so many of the movies made by Hollywood are endless sequels, “prequels,” and remakes of prior blockbuster hits and so many are based on comic books (X-men, Superman, Batman, and so on). I tie the explanation in part to the aforementioned 1950 Supreme Court ruling prohibiting production companies, and in part to broader cultural changes. In particular, I argue that precisely because film producers can no longer make money from the (...) concessions (i.e., the purchases within the theater), but only of the ticket sales, the producers keep producing remakes of known popular movies, rather than make deeply original movies. (shrink)

A response to critical commentaries. Crookston begins her commentary by noting that my book would have been better with answers to “the following three questions: (1) Why is the harm principle the right principle upon which to base a theory of toleration? (2) How is Cohen thinking of the concept of volenti? (p. x ) Is interference (i.e., the abandonment of toleration) ever morally required by the harm principle?” (p. x ). She is right, and I address these questions below (...) in Sections 2, 3, and 4. That is the bulk of this essay. I then turn to Kelley's issues in Sections 6, 7, and 8; these have to do with “the link between toleration and relativism,” the way I distinguish “the concepts of toleration and endurance,” and a “question about moral toleration” (p. x ). Despite much agreement, there are points of contention and I try to make my position clearer in response . (shrink)

A mass problem is a set of functions $\omega \to \omega $. For mass problems ${\mathcal {C}}, {\mathcal {D}}$, one says that ${\mathcal {C}}$ is Muchnik reducible to ${\mathcal {D}}$ if each function in ${\mathcal {C}}$ is computed by a function in ${\mathcal {D}}$. In this paper we study some highness properties of Turing oracles, which we view as mass problems. We compare them with respect to Muchnik reducibility and its uniform strengthening, Medvedev reducibility.For $p \in [0,1]$ let ${\mathcal {D}}$ (...) be the mass problem of infinite bit sequences y such that for each computable bit sequence x, the bit sequence $ x {\,\leftrightarrow\,} y$ has asymptotic lower density at most p = y$ ). We show that all members of this family of mass problems parameterized by a real p with $0 p$ for each computable set x. We prove that the Medvedev complexity of the mass problems ${\mathcal {B}}$ is the same for all $p \in $, by showing that they are Medvedev equivalent to the mass problem of functions bounded by ${2^{2}}^{n}$ that are almost everywhere different from each computable function.Next, together with Joseph Miller, we obtain a proper hierarchy of the mass problems of type $\text {IOE}$ : we show that for any order function g there exists a faster growing order function $h $ such that $\text {IOE}$ is strictly above $\text {IOE}$ in the sense of Muchnik reducibility.We study cardinal characteristics in the sense of set theory that are analogous to the highness properties above. For instance, ${\mathfrak {d}} $ is the least size of a set G of bit sequences such that for each bit sequence x there is a bit sequence y in G so that $\underline \rho >p$. We prove within ZFC all the coincidences of cardinal characteristics that are the analogs of the results above. (shrink)

A real x is -Kurtz random if it is in no closed null set . We show that there is a cone of -Kurtz random hyperdegrees. We characterize lowness for -Kurtz randomness as being -dominated and -semi-traceable.

An infinite binary sequence X is Kolmogorov–Loveland random if there is no computable non-monotonic betting strategy that succeeds on X in the sense of having an unbounded gain in the limit while betting successively on bits of X. A sequence X is KL-stochastic if there is no computable non-monotonic selection rule that selects from X an infinite, biased sequence.One of the major open problems in the field of effective randomness is whether Martin-Löf randomness is the same as KL-randomness. Our first (...) main result states that KL-random sequences are close to Martin-Löf random sequences in so far as every KL-random sequence has arbitrarily dense subsequences that are Martin-Löf random. A key lemma in the proof of this result is that for every effective split of a KL-random sequence at least one of the halves is Martin-Löf random. However, this splitting property does not characterize KL-randomness; we construct a sequence that is not even computably random such that every effective split yields two subsequences that are 2-random. Furthermore, we show for any KL-random sequence A that is computable in the halting problem that, first, for any effective split of A both halves are Martin-Löf random and, second, for any computable, nondecreasing, and unbounded function g and almost all n, the prefix of A of length n has prefix-free Kolmogorov complexity at least n−g. Again, the latter property does not characterize KL-randomness, even when restricted to left-r.e. sequences; we construct a left-r.e. sequence that has this property but is not KL-stochastic and, in fact, is not even Mises–Wald–Church stochastic.Turning our attention to KL-stochasticity, we construct a non-empty class of KL-stochastic sequences that are not weakly 1-random; by the usual basis theorems we obtain such sequences that in addition are left-r.e., are low, or are of hyperimmune-free degree.Our second main result asserts that every KL-stochastic sequence has effective dimension 1, or equivalently, a sequence cannot be KL-stochastic if it has infinitely many prefixes that can be compressed by a factor of α<1. This improves on a result by Muchnik, who has shown that were they to exist, such compressible prefixes could not be found effectively. (shrink)

We study the relative complexity of equivalence relations and preorders from computability theory and complexity theory. Given binary relationsR,S, a componentwise reducibility is defined byR≤S⇔ ∃f∀x, y[x R y↔fS f].Here,fis taken from a suitable class of effective functions. For us the relations will be on natural numbers, andfmust be computable. We show that there is a${\rm{\Pi }}_1^0$-complete equivalence relation, but no${\rm{\Pi }}_k^0$-complete fork≥ 2. We show that${\rm{\Sigma }}_k^0$preorders arising naturally in the above-mentioned areas are${\rm{\Sigma }}_k^0$-complete. This includes polynomial timem-reducibility on (...) exponential time sets, which is${\rm{\Sigma }}_2^0$, almost inclusion on r.e. sets, which is${\rm{\Sigma }}_3^0$, and Turing reducibility on r.e. sets, which is${\rm{\Sigma }}_4^0$. (shrink)

We study the sets that are computable from both halves of some (Martin–Löf) random sequence, which we call 1/2-bases. We show that the collection of such sets forms an ideal in the Turing degrees that is generated by its c.e. elements. It is a proper subideal of the K-trivial sets. We characterize 1/2-bases as the sets computable from both halves of Chaitin’s Ω, and as the sets that obey the cost function c(x,s)=Ωs−Ωx−−−−−−−√. Generalizing these results yields a dense hierarchy of (...) subideals in the K-trivial degrees: For k<n, let Bk/n be the collection of sets that are below any k out of n columns of some random sequence. As before, this is an ideal generated by its c.e. elements and the random sequence in the definition can always be taken to be Ω. Furthermore, the corresponding cost function characterization reveals that Bk/n is independent of the particular representation of the rational k/n, and that Bp is properly contained in Bq for rational numbers p<q. These results are proved using a generalization of the Loomis–Whitney inequality, which bounds the measure of an open set in terms of the measures of its projections. The generality allows us to analyze arbitrary families of orthogonal projections. As it turns out, these do not give us new subideals of the K-trivial sets; we can calculate from the family which Bp it characterizes. We finish by studying the union of Bp for p<1; we prove that this ideal consists of the sets that are robustly computable from some random sequence. This class was previously studied by Hirschfeldt [D. R. Hirschfeldt, C. G. Jockusch, R. Kuyper and P. E. Schupp, Coarse reducibility and algorithmic randomness, J. Symbolic Logic81(3) (2016) 1028–1046], who showed that it is a proper subclass of the K-trivial sets. We prove that all such sets are robustly computable from Ω, and that they form a proper subideal of the sets computable from every (weakly) LR-hard random sequence. We also show that the ideal cannot be characterized by a cost function, giving the first such example of a Σ03 subideal of the K-trivial sets. (shrink)

We argue that the pictorial nature of certain constructions in signs and in gestures explains surprising properties of their syntax. In several sign languages, the standard word order (e.g. SVO) gets turned into SOV (with preverbal arguments) when the predicate is a classifier, a distinguished construction with highly iconic properties (e.g. Pavlič, 2016). In silent gestures, participants also prefer an SOV order in extensional constructions, irrespective of the word order of the language they speak (Goldin-Meadow et al., 2008). But in (...) silent gestures and in Brazilian Sign Language (Libras), intensional constructions can override these SOV preferences, yielding SVO instead (Schouwstra & de Swart, 2014; Napoli et al., 2017). This distinction was argued to be due to iconicity: arguments are expressed before the verb if they correspond to entities that are present before the action, otherwise they follow the verb. While agreeing with this intuition, we propose that the extensional/intensional distinction is neither empirically nor theoretically appropriate. In new data from American Sign Language, we replicate the distinction among extensional classifier predicates: for _x ate up the ball_, the ball is typically seen before the eating and a preposed object is preferred; but for _x spit out the ball_, the ball is typically seen after the spitting and a postposed object is preferred, although both _eat up_ and _spit out_ are used extensionally. We extend this finding to data involving pro-speech (= speech-replacing) gestures embedded in French sentences. We argue for a Visibility Generalization according to which arguments appear before the verb if their denotations are typically visible before the action, and we develop a new formal account within a pictorial semantics for visual animations (inspired by Greenberg and Abusch). It derives the observed word order preferences, it explains how the semantics of classifier predicates combines iconic and conventional properties, and it makes a more general point: sign language semantics combines logical semantics with pictorial semantics. (shrink)

¿Cómo reacciona la ciudadanía en un sistema político polarizado ante una emergencia como la pandemia de la COVID-19?, ¿cómo procesa la ciudadanía las narrativas polarizadas que están en conflicto?, y ¿qué imagen se forman de la gestión política de la amenaza de la pandemia? En EE. UU, hay que retrotraerse a la epidemia de la polio de hace 70 años para encontrar una emergencia sanitaria como la pandemia de la COVID-19. No obstante, hay importantes diferencias; en la década de 1950, (...) el clima político de los EE.UU. era mucho más uniforme y consensuado que el actual, profundamente dividido y polarizado. Este trabajo utiliza datos de un estudio longitudinal realizado durante 35 años en personas jóvenes de la Generación X (ahora ya en la cuarentena) y datos provenientes de encuestas realizadas en Estados Unidos durante tres décadas, con el propósito de examinar los patrones de adquisición de la información en la comprensión de una nueva amenaza. Nuestro análisis de los últimos 35 años de la Generación X muestra que, en las elecciones de 2020, el factor predictivo del voto individual que tuvo más fuerza fue una ideología política polarizada, pero, aquellas personas que contaban con una mejor comprensión del coronavirus fueron más críticas con la gestión de la pandemia de la COVID-19 que realizó la administración de Donald Trump y estuvieron más predispuestas a votar por Joe Biden que a votar por Trump. Un análisis paralelo de una muestra probabilística representativa de personas adultas estadounidenses en 2020 reveló el mismo patrón de influencia del partidismo ideológico, la comprensión del coronavirus y la evaluación de la administración de Trump. Los resultados muestran que el conocimiento y la comprensión pueden proporcionar un efecto moderador crítico en un sistema político polarizado y dividido. (shrink)

This book is the first systematic treatment of 'responsibilist' or character-based virtue epistemology, an approach to epistemology that focuses on intellectual ...

The value problem in epistemology is rooted in a commonsense intuition to the effect that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. Call this the “guiding intuition.” The guiding intuition generates a problem in light of two additional considerations. The first is that knowledge is (roughly) justified or warranted true belief.[1] The second is that on certain popular accounts of justification or warrant (e.g. reliabilism), its value is apparently instrumental to and hence derivative from the value of true belief.[2] But (...) if knowledge is justified true belief and the value of justification is derivative from that of true belief, how is it that knowledge is more valuable than true belief? (shrink)

Jason Stanley presents a startling and provocative claim about knowledge: that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e. by how much is at stake for that person at that time. In defending this thesis, Stanley introduces readers to a number of strategies for resolving philosophical paradox, making the book essential not just for specialists in epistemology but for all philosophers interested in philosophical methodology. Since (...) a number of his strategies appeal to linguistic evidence, it will be of great interest to linguists as well. (shrink)

With its focus on intellectual virtues and their role in the acquisition and transmission of knowledge and related epistemic goods, virtue epistemology provides a rich set of tools for educational theory and practice. In particular, characteristics under the rubric of "responsibilist" virtue epistemology, like curiosity, open-mindedness, attentiveness, intellectual courage, and intellectual tenacity, can help educators and students define and attain certain worthy but nebulous educational goals like a love of learning, lifelong learning, and critical thinking. This volume is devoted to (...) exploring the intersection between virtue epistemology and education. It assembles leading virtue epistemologists and philosophers of education to address such questions as: Which virtues are most essential to education? How exactly should these virtues be understood? How is the goal of intellectual character growth related to other educational goals, for example, to critical thinking and knowledge-acquisition? What are the "best practices" for achieving this goal? Can growth in intellectual virtues be measured? The chapters are a prime example of "applied epistemology" and promise to be a seminal contribution to an area of research that is rapidly gaining attention within epistemology and beyond. (shrink)

In the Theological-Political Treatise, published in 1670, Spinoza asked why people “fight for their servitude as if for salvation.” In doing so, he foregrounded the affective dimension of despotism, putting forward the idea that servitude is not just passively endured but passionately strived for—something people want and will. Three hundred years later, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari repeated this formula in Anti-Oedipus, arguing that it was the central question of political philosophy. They read Spinoza through Wilhelm Reich, stating that the (...) astonishing thing is that “those who are exploited are not continually out on strike.” In doing so they shifted the political question from domination to exploitation. Following Deleuze and Guattari, I argue for an updated version of the question, asking why people fight for exploitation as if it were rebellion. Asking this question involves reexamining the way in which the critique of religion is the antechamber of the critique of political economy in Marx, and is the thread connecting Spinoza to Marx. Finally, I argue that reframing the question in terms of rebellion and exploitation is useful in making sense of contemporary forms of right populism that present themselves as rebellion, but actually deepen the domination of capitalism over our lives. (shrink)

This article examines two questions about scientists’ search for knowledge. First, which search strategies generate discoveries effectively? Second, is it advantageous to diversify search strategies? We argue pace Weisberg and Muldoon, “Epistemic Landscapes and the Division of Cognitive Labor”, that, on the first question, a search strategy that deliberately seeks novel research approaches need not be optimal. On the second question, we argue they have not shown epistemic reasons exist for the division of cognitive labor, identifying the errors that led (...) to their conclusions. Furthermore, we generalize the epistemic landscape model, showing that one should be skeptical about the benefits of social learning in epistemically complex environments. (shrink)

The horrendous deeds objection to metaethical divine command theory (MDCT) says that since God can command anything whatsoever, even things that are horrendous, MDCT seems to imply that God can make any action, no matter how repugnant, morally obligatory. Defenders of MDCT frequently claim, by way of response, that since God is essentially omnibenevolent, it is impossible that he commands us to do horrendous things. I have recently argued that it is irrelevant that God cannot issue horrible commands. The argument (...) runs as follows: On MDCT, God has moral grounding power — the power to make an action morally obligatory by commanding that we do it. Given that omnipotence is possession of maximal power, every omnipotent being has this power. In some possible world, there exists a non-benevolent omnipotent being who issues horrible commands. Therefore, on MDCT, there is a possible world in which some horrendous action is morally obligatory. Matthew Flannagan has responded to this argument on behalf of the divine command theorist. Flannagan argues that since, on MDCT, moral obligations are constituted by God’s commands, and no other being can perform God’s actions, no other being can possess moral grounding power. In this paper, I criticize Flannagan’s argument. His argument assumes that when some phenomenon is constituted by the actions of an agent, no other agent’s actions can constitute this phenomenon. I argue that this assumption is false. (shrink)